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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS SINCE 
EASTERN ENTERPRISES, WITH NEW 
DEFENSES BASED ON LACK OF CAUSATIVE 
NEXUS: THE SUPERFUND EXAMPLE 
Philip Jordan*
Abstract: Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel has renewed the relevance of one type 
of substantive due process reasoning by implicitly ruling that future 
statutory obligations to pay compensation are tempered by an analysis of 
the party’s actions and the alleged harm. Though the legal commentary 
has focused on Eastern Enterprises’s implications for cases involving takings 
and retroactive liability, the causative nexus analysis adds another 
dimension to its importance. This analysis is relevant to Superfund 
actions, particularly when innocent landowners are involved. Courts 
should address the causative nexus issue when determining liability to 
ensure that Superfund does not place unconstitutional burdens on 
private citizens. After Eastern Enterprises, proper substantive due process 
analysis requires courts to ask why a Potentially Responsible Party is the 
appropriate party to pay for a cleanup and whether such a burden is in 
line with this nation’s traditional notions of fairness. 
Introduction 
 A family with small children buys a home in Minnesota. They are 
happily settled in a suburban neighborhood when their children begin 
developing strange illnesses.1 They are dismayed to ªnd that the other 
children on the street are similarly sick. When it becomes clear that the 
illnesses cannot be coincidental, the state begins environmental testing 
and ªnds elevated levels of dioxins, PCPs, and hydrocarbons, all of 
which are linked to elevated cancer risk as well as impaired functioning 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004–05. 
B.A., University of Connecticut, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Benjamin Sachs, my 
undergraduate advisor and mentor, for his instrumental role in my academic develop-
ment. I would also like to extend special thanks to Professor Zygmunt Plater for his advice, 
support, and critical insights into this topic. 
1 This hypothetical is based on an actual Superfund site in Minnesota. See generally 
Minn. Pollution Control Agency, Joslyn Manufacturing Site Superfund and VIC 
Cleanups (May 2001), http://www.pca.state.mn.us/publications/g-27-03.pdf. 
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of the heart, liver, and kidneys.2 A further investigation discovers that a 
paper mill had disposed of its wastes on the lands underneath the 
homes for a period of thirty years.3 Suppose that the paper mill is no 
longer in business and has no assets. State and federal Superfund laws 
have developed a complex retroactive joint and several liability scheme 
to address such situations, with limited carve-outs for innocent land-
owners.4 The 1998 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfel potentially protects these types of defendants from liability 
through its substantive due process protections.5
 This Note is an exploration of the potentially renewed relevance 
of one form of substantive due process analysis, springing from a com-
mon line of argument within each of the opinions in the Eastern En-
terprises decision.6 This particular substantive due process inquiry fo-
cuses on whether a citizen can defend against a statutory obligation to 
pay compensation by showing that there was no causative nexus be-
tween the citizen’s actions and the harm being compensated.7 
Speciªcally, this Note will examine the implications of Eastern Enter-
prises’s substantive due process analysis for innocent landowners held 
liable under state and federal Superfund laws. 
I. The Federal Response: The Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act 
 The Ninety-Sixth Congress passed the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 after 
several highly publicized toxic waste sites illustrated the need for a fed-
eral law to deal with the growing problem of hazardous waste contami-
nation and its effect on public health.8 By passing CERCLA, Congress 
created a complex scheme to clean toxic sites, administered by the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA).9 The major CERCLA provisions 
assign liability to categories of actors that Congress deemed potentially 
                                                                                                                      
2 Id. at 2. 
3 See id. at 1. 
4 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 
9607 (2000); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 5 (2004). 
5 524 U.S. 498, 547 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
6 See id. at 523–24 (O’Connor, J.); id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 566–67 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
7 See opinions cited supra note 6. 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675; see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, et al., Environmental Law and 
Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 886 (3d ed. 2004). 
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675. 
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responsible,10 create and maintain a “Superfund” through a general tax 
on polluting industries to clean the most polluted sites,11 and authorize 
EPA to promulgate regulations and remediate toxic sites.12
 CERCLA also grants administrative order authority to EPA, ena-
bling it to bring administrative and enforcement actions to ensure 
remediation.13 The administrative order authority is “perhaps [EPA’s] 
most potent enforcement tool.”14 EPA may commence such an action 
whenever a site “may [present] an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to public health or . . . the environment” by issuing “such 
orders as may be necessary to the protect public health and welfare 
and the environment.”15 Though EPA prefers to administer voluntary 
remediation through settlement agreements, its stated policy indi-
cates that it will take further action if necessary.16 If the parties do not 
comply with the order, EPA may fund its own cleanup or may refer the 
case for judicial action to compel performance and recover penal-
ties.17 Additionally, under the Polluter Pays Principle,18 CERCLA au-
thorizes EPA to sue responsible parties for cleanup costs, in order to 
replenish the Superfund for subsequent cleanups.19
A. Strict Liability 
 Responsible parties are held strictly liable for remediation costs.20 
This means that parties are liable for cleanup costs even when they 
are not negligent. Furthermore, causation is not a factor for CERCLA 
litigation.21 CERCLA imposes joint and several strict liability on four 
categories of parties, called Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs): 
(1) generators of hazardous wastes; (2) transporters of waste to and 
                                                                                                                      
10 Id. § 9607(a) (2000). 
11 Hazardous Substance Superfund, 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9611. 
12 42 U.S.C. § 9606. 
13 Id. § 9606(a). 
14 Plater, supra note 8, at 927. 
15 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 
16 U.S. EPA, OSWER Directive No. 9833.0-1a, at 2 (Mar. 7, 1990), http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/cerc106-uao-rpt.pdf. When viable 
private entities exist and are unwilling to reach a timely settlement to undertake remedia-
tion under a consent order or decree—or in some circumstances prior to any settlement 
discussions—the Agency will typically compel private party response through unilateral 
orders. Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Plater, supra note 8, at 887. 
19 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000). 
20 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). 
21 Id. 
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from disposal sites; (3) current owners and operators of facilities with 
contamination; and (4) owners and operators of facilities at the time 
of disposal of the waste.22 These parties are responsible for response 
costs expended by the federal government or a state or, via injunc-
tion, can be held responsible for cleaning the site themselves.23
B. Retroactive Application to Pre-1980 Pollution 
 The courts have uniformly upheld the liability provisions of 
CERCLA.24 Most of the challenges to date have involved the retroac-
tive application of CERCLA liability, based on the Ninth Amendment 
prohibition of ex post facto laws as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ guarantees of substantive due process and prohibition 
of uncompensated takings.25 Congress did not explicitly state its in-
tent to apply CERCLA liability retroactively.26 Two cases established 
retroactive liability by interpreting sections 106 and 107 of CERCLA 
to infer that polluters must pay for cleanup even if the actions were 
committed before the statute’s passage.27
 State of Ohio ex rel. William J. Brown v. Georgeoff ªrst established the 
principle of retroactive application of CERCLA in 1983.28 In that case, 
the State of Ohio attempted to impose CERCLA liability on polluters 
who dumped regulated chemicals ªve years before CERCLA’s enact-
ment.29 In order to resolve retroactivity in the absence of plain statu-
tory language, the district court relied on legislative history to deter-
mine that Congress intended the liability to apply to both prior and 
future actions.30
 After these early decisions establishing retroactivity, a series of 
cases followed that attempted to attack the constitutionality of the ret-
                                                                                                                      
22 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
23 Id. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a). 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733–34, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) 
[NEPACCO]. 
25 See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 174; NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 733–34, 749; HRW Sys. Inc. v. 
Wash. Gas, 823 F. Supp. 318, 329 (D. Md. 1993). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000); see United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109–10 
(D.N.J. 1983); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1302, 1309 (N.D. Ohio 
1983). For an in-depth analysis of CERCLA’s retroactivity, see David Milton Whalin, Is There 
Still Pre-1980 CERCLA Liability After Eastern Enterprises?, 5 Envtl. Law. 701 (1999). 
27 See Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1112; Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1302, 1309–14. 
28 See 562 F. Supp. at 1302. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1308–09, 1314. 
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roactive application of CERCLA.31 Perhaps the most important of 
these cases from a substantive due process standpoint is United States v. 
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.32 In that case, the district court 
found no constitutional violation because CERCLA was not in fact 
retroactive.33 The court noted that CERCLA is a remedial “statute that 
attaches liability to present conditions stemming from past acts [and] 
does not necessarily have retroactive effects that are subject to [sub-
stantive] due process limitations.”34
 The South Carolina Recycling court relied heavily on Usery v. Turner 
Elkhorn Mining Co., which was the leading case dealing with constitu-
tional law and retroactive statutes.35 The Turner Elkhorn Court held that 
economic statutes violate substantive due process if they are irrational 
and arbitrary.36 The South Carolina Recycling court found that CERCLA, 
as applied retroactively, was in line with the reasoning of Turner Elkhorn 
because it was a rational means to accomplishing Congress’s goal.37 
Further, the court noted that South Carolina Recycling could be held 
liable because there was a reasonable nexus between the actors and the 
alleged harm.38 In determining whether this nexus existed, the court 
reasoned: “Congress intended through CERCLA to create a broad re-
medial statute which allocates to those persons responsible for creating 
dangerous conditions, and who proªted from such activities, the true 
costs of their enterprise.”39 It is therefore evident that the court found 
it rational for Congress to spread the costs of liabilities from pollution 
among parties who caused or beneªted from that pollution, and there-
fore that there was no due process violation.40
 In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. 
(NEPACCO), the defendant was found to have disposed of several ªfty-
ªve-gallon drums of hazardous wastes on the Denney Farm from 1970 
to 1972.41 Despite the fact that the acts were committed prior to the 
passage of CERCLA, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held 
                                                                                                                      
31 United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 429–30 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v. S.C. 
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D.S.C. 1986). 
32 See 653 F. Supp. at 996–98. 
33 Id. at 996. 
34 Id. 
35 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); see Whalin, supra note 26, at 
727. 
36 Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18. 
37 S.C. Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 997–98; see Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18. 
38 See Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18; S.C. Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 997–98. 
39 S.C. Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 998. 
40 Id. 
41 NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 729–30 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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that “[c]leaning up inactive and abandoned hazardous waste disposal 
sites is a legitimate legislative purpose, and Congress acted in a ra-
tional manner in imposing liability . . . upon those parties who cre-
ated and proªted from the sites . . . .”42 NEPACCO is important for 
three major reasons: (1) it reafªrmed that CERCLA was intended to 
apply retroactively; (2) it supported the reasoning in South Carolina 
Recycling that substantive due process is not violated in cases when an 
enterprise is assigned liability because it caused or beneªted from an 
activity; and (3) it held that government cleanup of toxic sites is not a 
taking at all because no property interest is affected.43
 These cases are interesting because retroactive statutes are typically 
met with disfavor.44 Justice Story noted in his treatise on the Constitu-
tion that “[r]etrospective laws are, as a rule, of questionable policy, and 
contrary to the general principle that legislation . . . ought not to 
change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of 
then existing law.”45 The specter of retroactivity has troubled even more 
recent Supreme Court Justices because such laws “can deprive citizens 
of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.”46
 The courts have looked to the Ex Post Facto Clause as well as the 
takings and substantive due process provisions of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to demonstrate the constitutional concerns with 
retroactive laws.47 Due to these concerns, the courts seem to hold ret-
roactive statutes to a slightly higher level of scrutiny and validate them 
only when such statutes are “clearly just and reasonable, and condu-
cive to the general welfare,”48 yet appear to invalidate them only un-
der the “most egregious of circumstances.”49
C. Defenses to CERCLA Litigation 
 The initial version of CERCLA provided a defense if the release 
of toxic substances was due to: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; or 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. at 734. 
43 Id. at 733–34. 
44 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532–33 (1998); see Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1996); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204, 208 (1988). 
45 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1398 (1891). 
46 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992). 
47 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 533–34, 547–48 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Landgraf v. USI 
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 
16–17 (1976). 
48 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 455–56 (3d ed. 1983). 
49 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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(3) an act or omission of a third party.50 The third-party defense is a 
difªcult one because the statute requires that the party not be “an 
employee or agent of the defendant, or . . . one whose act or omission 
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly 
or indirectly, with the defendant . . . .”51
 In terms of practical availability, the defense has not often been 
successful because purchase and sale agreements create a contractual 
relationship, and therefore many “innocent landowners” who pur-
chased contaminated property—but who did not contribute to or 
have any knowledge of the contamination—would be held liable for 
massive cleanup costs.52 This well-settled standard of liability through 
contractual relationship can cause serious problems for parties who 
did not contribute to or beneªt from pollution on their property.53
 Partially in response to unintended innocent landowner liability, 
Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act of 1986 (SARA).54 SARA includes a provision that provides a de-
fense for innocent landowners who had no reason to know that the 
property was polluted at the time of purchase.55 The owner must have 
taken “all appropriate inquiries…into the previous ownership and 
uses of the facility in accordance with generally accepted good com-
mercial and customary standards and practices.”56 At a minimum, the 
statute requires that purchasers complete a title search to determine 
all prior uses of the property.57 In addition, many courts now consider 
“all appropriate inquiry” to include costly environmental site assess-
ments.58 The result has been an explosion of due diligence and envi-
ronmental site investigations; however, the innocent landowner de-
                                                                                                                      
50 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000). 
51 Id. § 9607(b)(3). 
52 Debra L. Baker & Theodore G. Baroody, What Price Innocence? A Realistic View of the 
Innocent Landowner Defense Under CERCLA, 22 St. Mary’s L.J. 115, 116 (1990); see New York 
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that Congress was 
unclear about what constitutes an appropriate inquiry, and it must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis); Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 
(D.N.J. 1987). 
53 Baker & Baroody, supra note 52, at 116; see Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044, 1049; Jersey 
City Redevelopment, 655 F. Supp. at 1261. 
54 Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 2, 100 Stat. 1628 (codiªed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675). 
55 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (2000). 
57 Id. § 9601(35)(B)(iii)(III). 
58 Id. § 9601(35)(B)(iii)(I); see United States v. Seraªni, 706 F. Supp. 346, 353 (M.D. 
Pa. 1988). 
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fense is rarely successful when raised in court59 because the courts 
hold parties to an extremely high standard.60 If after reviewing the 
title history, there is any possibility that a landowner should have 
known that a commercial or industrial use had occurred on the prop-
erty, costly site assessments must be conducted.61 However, merely 
conducting a thorough environmental assessment does not shield an 
owner from liability should pollution later be found.62
 Another potential pitfall for innocent landowners exists in the 
structure of CERCLA. In light of the retroactive nature of CERCLA, 
parties can be held responsible for discharges that were not known to 
be toxic at the time of disposal.63 This makes it quite possible that 
even when a landowner conducts an appropriate inquiry, materials or 
substances on the property that are not currently tested for or known 
to be toxic could cause future liability for landowners.64
D. State Superfund Laws 
 Following the passage of CERCLA, many states enacted their own 
Superfund laws to deal with toxic sites that would not make the Na-
tional Priorities List.65 Massachusetts was one such state, enacting the 
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release, Prevention, and 
Response Act in 1983 (Massachusetts Superfund Law).66 The Massa-
chusetts Superfund Law has been amended several times, most nota-
bly in 1986 by referendum,67 and in 1992 to clarify the liability provi-
sions and delegate authority for cleanups.68 The law uses CERCLA’s 
deªnition of “hazardous substances” and also applies a similar liability 
scheme.69 However, the Massachusetts statute goes much further in 
three regards.70 First, Massachusetts has a broader liability net by in-
                                                                                                                      
59 See Seraªni, 706 F. Supp. at 353; see also 135 Cong. Rec. H3514–15 (daily ed. June 28, 
1989) (statement of Rep. Curt Weldon). 
60 See generally Seraªni, 706 F. Supp. at 353 (holding that the standard should be deter-
mined based on a series of factors including the expertise of the purchaser and the extent 
of site assessment). 
61 See Baker & Baroody, supra note 52, at 125. 
62 See id. at 116–17. 
63 See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, 732–33 (4th Cir. 1988). 
64 See id. 
65 See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release, Prevention, and Re-
sponse Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E (2002). 
66 1983 Mass. Acts 7, § 5. 
67 1986 Mass. Acts 554, § 2. 
68 1992 Mass. Acts 133, § 309. 
69 Id. § 2. 
70 Id. §§ 5, 13. 
2005] Lack of Causative Nexus and Substantive Due Process 403
  
cluding—in addition to CERCLA’s four categories of PRPs—“any per-
son who otherwise caused or is legally responsible for a release or 
threat of release of oil or hazardous material from a vessel or a site 
. . . .”71 This catchall provision has effectively captured more “middle-
men” due to its open-ended nature.72 Second, Massachusetts treats 
the cleanup costs associated with a contaminated site as a debt owed 
to the Commonwealth—due at twelve percent interest per year.73 Be-
cause the cleanup costs constitute a debt, a “superlien” is placed on 
the property and the costs act as a lien on all property rights presently 
or subsequently owned, thereby holding the original and all subse-
quent landowners liable for cleanup costs.74 Finally, the Massachusetts 
statute allows the government to collect treble damages, making the 
potential liability astronomical.75
 Like the federal model, Massachusetts applies retroactive, strict, 
joint and several liability for cleanup costs.76 This means that the par-
ties mentioned are liable under the statute even without fault, a prem-
ise upheld by the Massachusetts courts: 
It is insufªcient under section 5(c)(3) . . . to prove due care 
in transporting the hazardous wastes to the site only. Other-
wise, [parties] would not be liable if they proved that they 
were not negligent. This reading of the third-party defense 
would undermine the strict liability provisions of c. 21E.77
 The Massachusetts Superfund Law, like CERCLA, contains limita-
tions to the liability of parties.78 Like CERCLA, parties are not liable 
for releases caused by an act of God or war.79 However, Massachusetts 
also provides exemptions for bona ªde tenants, many government 
agencies, lenders, and downgradient property owners.80 In addition, 
under the Massachusetts Superfund Law, current owners/operators 
who did not own or operate at the time of release, or did not cause or 
contribute to the release or threat of release, are only liable up to the 
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. § 5(a)(5). 
72 John F. Shea, Hazardous Waste Cleanup Law, in Massachusetts Continuing Legal 
Education Handbook 22-1 (2002); see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 5 (2002). 
73 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 13. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. § 5(e). 
76 See id. § 5. 
77 Massachusetts v. Pace, 616 F. Supp. 815, 819–20 (D. Mass. 1985). 
78 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, §§ 5(c), 17 (2002). 
79 Id. § 5(c)(1), (2).  
80 Id. § 5D.  
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value of the property, essentially limiting the liability to the invest-
ment in the property.81
II. Eastern Enterprises 
 Eastern Enterprises has received a fair amount of attention from the 
legal community, but most of the focus has been on the issues of 
deªning takings and retroactive statutes in general.82 Eastern Enterprises 
implicates a third important proposition, however. The most innovative 
element of the Eastern Enterprises decision may well be its adoption of a 
causative nexus inquiry which, depending on how the votes are ana-
lyzed, is supported by at least a 5–4 vote, and arguably represents an 
implicit consensus.83 It can be argued that under this third proposition 
from Eastern Enterprises—which has not received sufªcient academic 
notice—that when the government compels actions by private parties 
or attaches liability for alleged harms, a causative nexus must exist be-
tween the actors and the harm.84 Although the Justices split as to out-
come of the case, on this point it appears that all nine justices followed 
a substantive due process causative nexus reasoning in their various 
opinions.85 After analyzing this third theme in the Eastern Enterprises 
opinions, it appears that the lack-of-causative-nexus defense might ap-
ply in the setting of innocent property owners’ liability for toxic clean-
ups.86 Eastern Enterprises may be rightly or wrongly decided as to its par-
ticular outcome, but its substantive due process inquiry is clearly 
important and useful in framing possible limits for regulatory imposi-
tions of ªnancial liability upon innocent third parties.87
A. Eastern Enterprises: Substantive Due Process and Takings 
 It is little wonder that there is marked confusion over when and 
how to undertake a substantive due process inquiry.88 Eastern Enter-
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. § 5(d). 
82 See generally Karen S. Danahy, CERCLA Retroactive Liability in the Aftermath of Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 48 Buff. L. Rev. 509 (2000) (discussing Eastern Enterprises’s implica-
tions for retroactive statutes); Whalin, supra note 26. 
83 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 531 (1998); id. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
id. at 560 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
84 See opinions cited supra note 83. 
85 See opinions cited supra note 83. 
86 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(B) (2000), 9607(B); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 5(d) 
(2004). 
87 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(B), 9607(B); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 5(d). 
88 See generally John Decker Bristow, Note, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel: Is the Court One 
Step Closer to Unraveling the Takings and Due Process Clauses?, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1525, 1525–26 
 
2005] Lack of Causative Nexus and Substantive Due Process 405
  
prises comes at the end of a long period of inconsistent handling of 
substantive due process and takings cases.89 This series of divergent 
decisions over the last seventy years makes the clariªcation by the 
Eastern Enterprises Court that much more signiªcant.90
 The protection of due process of law is rooted in the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of 
. . . property, without due process of law.”91 This text was copied ex-
actly into the Fourteenth Amendment to apply due process to state 
government actions as well.92 Courts have found that the Due Process 
Clauses, in addition to providing procedural rights, also include sub-
stantive protections.93 The clause has been interpreted to protect citi-
zens from “arbitrary and irrational”94 laws and to prevent government 
actions which shock the conscience, ensuring “fair application of 
law.”95 Stated plainly, though legislation comes to the courts with a 
presumption of constitutionality, the Due Process Clauses protect citi-
zens by ensuring principles of fundamental fairness in the way legisla-
tures enact laws that impose burdens on private actors.96 Such actions 
must be rationally related to a government purpose, and the analysis 
“turn[s] on the legitimacy of Congress’ judgment.”97 Cases must be 
seen “in light of a basic purpose: the fair application of law, which pur-
pose hearkens back to the Magna Carta.”98
 The Supreme Court has been hesitant to invalidate economic 
legislation on due process grounds, due to a fear of judges substitut-
ing their own judgment for the will of legislatures.99 The Court, how-
ever, has ruled that it may invalidate legislation “under the most egre-
                                                                                                                      
(1999) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s Eastern Enterprises concurrence and Justice Breyer’s 
dissent as clarifying the differences between takings and substantive due process). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
92 Id. at amend. XIV. 
93 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992); United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884); Peter J. 
Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill 
of Rights, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 841–42 (2003). 
94 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
95 See Collins, 503 U.S. at 126; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746; Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 532; Rubin, 
supra note 93, at 841–42. 
96 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 558 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
98 Id. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
99 See id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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gious of circumstances.”100 Those circumstances arise when legisla-
tures enact laws that are “fundamentally unfair” because such laws are 
“basically arbitrary.”101
1. The Lochner-Era’s Broad Interpretation of Substantive Due Process 
 In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Court 
regularly used substantive due process to invalidate legislation.102 This 
period of time is known as the Lochner Era, named after Lochner v. New 
York.103 Lochner was the ªrst case to hold that government actions were 
void for lack of substantive due process if they were arbitrary or irra-
tional.104 Similarly, in Truax v. Corrigan, the Supreme Court held that 
fundamental property rights exist and must be respected by states.105 
Despite the fact that the Court has overruled most of Lochner,106 many 
appellate courts over the last twenty-ªve years have slowly returned to 
invalidating economic legislation on substantive due process grounds.107
 Lochner v. New York was the apex of substantive due process litiga-
tion.108 In Lochner, a bakery owner was charged with requiring and 
permitting an employee to work over sixty hours per week, in viola-
tion of the labor laws of the State of New York.109 The Court was care-
ful to note that the employee was not forced to work over sixty hours, 
and that the New York statute was an 
absolute prohibition upon the employer permitting, under 
any circumstances, more than ten hours’ work to be done in 
his establishment. The employee may desire to earn the ex-
tra money which would arise from his working more than 
                                                                                                                      
100 Id. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
953 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). 
101 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
102 See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 Syra-
cuse L. Rev. 917, 918 (1999). 
103 See 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
104 Id. at 56, 63. 
105 257 U.S. 314, 328 (1921). 
106 Phillips, supra note 102, at 924. 
107 Id. at 924–26; see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that the majority decision resurrects economic substantive due proc-
ess); Littleªeld v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 604, 607–08 (8th Cir. 1986); Epstein v. Town-
ship of Whitehall, 696 F. Supp. 309, 312–14 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that economic laws 
cannot be arbitrary or irrational). 
108 198 U.S. 45; see Phillips, supra note 102, at 920–21. 
109 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52. 
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the prescribed time, but this statute forbids the employer 
from permitting the employee to earn it.110
 The Court continued by establishing that the right to contract for 
work is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.111 Though the Court recognized that 
the state had within its police powers the right to prevent certain types 
of contracts when speciªc factors—such as general health and 
safety—were present, it laid a foundation for balancing the power of 
the state against the rights of individuals.112 In Lochner, the Court 
therefore found that it must determine whether there was a reason-
able ground for New York to limit the ability of bakers to enter into 
contracts for more than sixty hours per week.113
 After setting the stage for the balancing test, the Court quickly 
found that there was no “reasonable ground for interfering with the 
liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the 
hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.”114 Because New York did 
not have a legitimate reason for limiting the right of the employee, 
the statute was found to be an unconstitutional violation of the Due 
Process Clause.115
2. Beyond Lochner: The Current State of Due Process 
 Today, much of Lochner has been overruled, and the Lochner-era 
substantive due process cases have been maligned and repudiated by 
the legal community.116 The major reason for the disapproval met by 
the Lochner era is the enormous power claimed by the courts to invali-
date legislation.117 This sweeping power has been seen by many as the 
ultimate anathema to democratic legislative power.118 Much of this 
                                                                                                                      
110 Id. at 52–53. 
111 Id. at 53. 
112 Id. at 53–54. 
113 Id. at 57. 
114 Id. 
115 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58. The Court stated: 
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end 
itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be 
valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his 
person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor. 
Id. 
116 Phillips, supra note 102, at 921–23. 
117 Id. at 921–22. 
118 Id. at 922. 
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criticism is based on the presumption that the Lochner Court readily 
imposed its own ideas of economic and policy goals into its decisions.119 
It is claimed that the Court often substituted its own wisdom and de-
sires—by judging for itself which prohibitions and requirements were 
legitimate and rational—for the judgment of legislatures.120
 In 1937, the Supreme Court ended the Lochner era with West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish.121 Following West Coast Hotel, the Court entered a 
period of levying a very lenient standard for the government to rebut 
substantive due process challenges. Such legislation seemingly always 
survived substantive due process inquiries.122 However, certain impor-
tant parts of the Lochner substantive due process analysis have been 
retained, and economic substantive due process seems to be making a 
resurgence.123 Courts are increasingly deciding economic cases on the 
basis of substantive due process by determining whether or not the 
government action is rationally related to a speciªc purpose.124 
Though these cases are still in the minority when contrasted with the 
large number of cases in which substantive due process claims are re-
jected, the courts now recognize that economic legislation must at 
least be analyzed under the rational basis test and, at a minimum, a 
challenged law must: (1) aim at achieving a legitimate public purpose; 
(2) use means reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose; and (3) 
not be unduly oppressive.125 Though most of the cases deal with state 
or municipal government actions against private parties—and there-
fore are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause—there are several cases involving the federal government that 
show that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects the 
same interests and requires the same rational basis test.126
                                                                                                                      
119 See id. at 923. 
120 See id. at 922–23. 
121 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
122 Phillips, supra note 102, at 923–24. 
123 See id. at 924–25. 
124 See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1974); Littleªeld v. City 
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B. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel: The Case 
1. Background 
 Eastern Enterprises, a Massachusetts coal company, opposed pro-
visions in the Coal Act of 1974, which required compensation for 
harms to coal miners’ health by establishing an employee health and 
retirement beneªt fund.127 The Coal Act was drafted to determine 
liability for particular employers based on the Commissioner of Social 
Security’s (Commissioner) assessment of the premium payments ac-
cording to the following formula: 
[T]he Commissioner of Social Security shall . . . assign each 
coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneªciary to a signa-
tory operator which (or any related person with respect to 
which) remains in business in the following order: 
 (1) First, to the signatory operator which—  
 (A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or 
any subsequent coal wage agreement, and 
 (B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the 
coal industry retiree in the coal industry for at least 2 years. 
 (2) Second, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph 
(1), to the signatory operator which—  
 (A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or 
any subsequent coal wage agreement, and 
 (B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the 
coal industry retiree in the coal industry. 
 (3) Third, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph 
(1) or (2), to the signatory operator which employed the 
coal industry retiree in the coal industry for a longer period 
of time than any other signatory operator prior to the effec-
tive date of the 1978 coal wage agreement.128
This legislation assessed liability to any successor interests of a coal 
operator, even if these entities no longer produced coal.129
 With regards to Eastern Enterprises, the Coal Act therefore im-
posed liability to pay premiums based on the number of the com-
pany’s employees.130 Eastern Enterprises argued that congressional 
                                                                                                                      
127 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 515 (1998). 
128 26 U.S.C. § 9706 (2000). 
129 See id. § 9701(c)(2). 
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legislation assessing retroactive liability for retiree beneªts was uncon-
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment, and cast its attack on the 
statute in terms of both regulatory takings131 and substantive due pro-
cess.132 The plurality opinion, authored by Justice O’Connor, held 
that the legislation constituted a takings violation,133 while Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion denied that it was a taking, concluding 
instead that the legislation was void because it violated substantive due 
process.134 The dissent adopted and applied a substantive due process 
analysis, but reached a contrary conclusion, ªnding no violation.135
 Eastern Enterprises was established in 1929 as a Massachusetts 
Business Trust involved in coal mining operations in West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania.136 There is no question that Eastern Enterprises em-
ployed a number of miners who subsequently would be granted 
beneªts by the Coal Act in 1992.137 In 1950, Eastern Enterprises en-
tered into the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA), 
creating the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement 
Fund (“1950 W&R Fund”).138 The 1950 W&R Fund provided retire-
ment and health care beneªts through premium payments by coal min-
ing companies.139 Under the terms of this agreement, the beneªts 
could be revised at any time by the board of trustees, and in the period 
between 1950 and 1974, the trustees made frequent revisions to ensure 
the ªscal stability of the fund.140 Eastern Enterprises ceased its coal 
mining operations in 1965,141 however, and at that time had no long-
term agreement with its workers to provide health beneªts.142
 In 1974, the political landscape had changed in the coal mining 
industry generally, and as a result of amendments to the law, a new 
agreement was forged to provide permanent lifetime beneªts to em-
ployees and their widows.143 This was the ªrst agreement to explicitly 
include health beneªts for retirees.144 The new provisions did not, 
                                                                                                                      
131 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 529. 
132 Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
133 Id. at 529. 
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140 Id. at 508. 
141 Id. at 516. 
142 Id. at 507–08. 
143 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 509. 
144 See id. 
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however, change the ªxed-cost allocation or include liability beyond 
the life of the agreement.145 Quickly after its creation, it became evi-
dent that the funding of the plans was inadequate due to increases in 
eligibility and health care costs,146 resulting in congressional action to 
change the laws again in 1992 with the enactment of the Coal Act.147
 The Coal Act merged the 1974 and 1950 funds, and assigned 
premium payments according to a formula.148 The new formula des-
ignated the amounts to any operator that had been bound by previ-
ous NBCWA agreements based on the length of service to a particular 
company.149 Congress’s purpose was “to identify persons most respon-
sible for [1950 and 1974 Beneªt Plan] liabilities in order to stabilize 
plan funding and allow for the provision of health care beneªts to . . . 
retirees.”150 Because Eastern Enterprises had ceased coal mining op-
erations by 1965, it challenged its liability under the Coal Act.151
2. Eastern Enterprises and Takings: The Plurality 
 Writing for the initial plurality of four, Justice O’Connor based 
her opinion on the theory that the Coal Act violated the Takings 
Clause.152 Justice O’Connor detailed the three factors of “economic” 
takings cases—that is, those cases in which the government has not 
actually seized property, but rather assigned a public burden to a pri-
vate party: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) its interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of 
the governmental action.153 Implicitly, however, the initial plurality 
reºected substantive due process reasoning in what it called a “tak-
ings” analysis.154 The core of Justice O’Connor’s takings analysis is 
that the act applied liability to Eastern Enterprises for actions it took 
decades before any promises were made, and with no active causation 
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of harm.155 Interestingly, three of the four cases used by the plurality 
in support of its analysis were actually challenges based on substantive 
due process, as pointed out by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence.156
 The plurality applied the three takings factors and found that the 
Coal Act was unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises be-
cause it implicated fundamental principles of fairness by imposing “a 
burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ conduct 
far in the past, and [conduct] unrelated to . . . any injury they caused.”157 
This demonstrates all three prongs of Eastern Enterprises’s importance: 
(1) takings burdens; (2) retroactivity; and (3) the need for a causal 
nexus to exist between the injury which Congress is addressing in the 
legislation and the party being held liable.158 The due process inquiry 
was not undertaken and analyzed by the plurality of four because Jus-
tice O’Connor framed her decision as a ªnding that the Coal Act was 
an unconstitutional taking.159
3. The Kennedy Concurrence and Substantive Due Process 
 Justice Kennedy’s opinion forces the analysis of Eastern Enterprises 
into the realm of substantive due process.160 Justice Kennedy agreed 
with the plurality that severe retroactivity can invalidate a law, but in-
sisted that the question be viewed through a substantive due process 
lens.161 Justice Kennedy took issue with several aspects of the plural-
ity’s reasoning in his concurrence.162 First and foremost, Justice Ken-
nedy posited that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment involves 
actual seizure of property by the government or regulatory restric-
tions that in essence limit the use or value of the property.163 Put sim-
ply, the Takings Clause only operates on a real or regulatory “take.”164 
Justice Kennedy underlined this point by showing that the Coal Act, 
while creating ªnancial liability for Eastern Enterprises, does not “op-
                                                                                                                      
155 See id. at 537. 
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erate upon or alter an identiªed property interest, and is not applica-
ble to or measured by a property interest. . . . The law simply imposes 
an obligation to perform an act, the payment of beneªts.”165 Because 
Congress has substantial leeway in how it assigns burdens, a takings 
analysis requires the Court to apply a complicated and fact-intensive 
inquiry in order to assess whether or not a taking has occurred.166 
Further, Justice Kennedy noted that the Takings Clause does not typi-
cally invalidate legislation; it gives government the option either to 
cease its action or to provide compensation for the property taken.167 
Justice Kennedy supported this view with precedent: 
“As its language indicates, and as the Court has frequently 
noted, [the Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of 
private property, but instead places a condition on the exer-
cise of that power. This basic understanding of the Amend-
ment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the govern-
mental interference with property rights per se, but rather to 
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper inter-
ference amounting to a taking.”168
 In Eastern Enterprises, Justice Kennedy deemed it impossible to 
devise a monetary remedy, but rather he stated that the issue “appears 
to turn on the legitimacy of Congress’ judgment.”169 According to Jus-
tice Kennedy, the appropriate vehicle for invalidating legislation and 
addressing notions of fairness, as mentioned above, is the Due Process 
Clause.170
 Justice Kennedy continued his opinion with a thorough due proc-
ess analysis.171 Most importantly, Justice Kennedy noted that severely 
retroactive legislation violates due process because such laws “change 
the legal consequences of transactions long closed . . . [and] destroy 
the reasonable certainty and security which are the very objects of 
property ownership.”172 A signiªcant further aspect of the Kennedy 
concurrence is its inquiry into the presence or absence of a causative 
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nexus.173 In part, this was a follow-up on the retroactivity discussion.174 
Because Eastern Enterprises left the business of coal operation long 
before the statute imposed liability upon it, and because it never agreed 
to any type of long-term beneªts, the company was not within the 
causal nexus of harm necessary in due process jurisprudence.175 Justice 
Kennedy explained this point by stating that Eastern Enterprises “was 
not responsible for their expectation of lifetime health beneªts”176 and 
therefore, “the Coal Act bears no legitimate relation to the interest 
which the Government asserts in support of the statute.”177
 But further, Justice Kennedy’s opinion incorporated the logic of 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality—that Eastern Enterprises had not caused 
the injuries—and argued that the issue was more properly considered 
as a substantive due process analysis.178 As Justice Kennedy noted, this 
was the very precept used by the plurality, though they inappropri-
ately labeled it a takings analysis.179
4. Support for the Substantive Due Process Approach from the 
Dissent 
 Irrespective of the vote count as to outcome, the dissent is notable 
for its agreement with Justice Kennedy that the issue must be framed in 
terms of substantive due process.180 The dissent, authored by Justice 
Breyer, applied a due process analysis, and agreed with Justice Kennedy 
that the Takings Clause did not apply.181 Justice Breyer detailed a brief 
history of the Court’s use of the Takings Clause in his analysis.182 First, 
he noted that the purpose of the Takings Clause was not “preventing 
arbitrary or unfair government action, but [rather] providing 
compensation for legitimate government action that takes ‘private 
property’ to serve the ‘public’ good.”183 The dissent, therefore, also 
focused on whether or not a taking occurred in Eastern Enterprises, 
noting that “[t]he ‘private property’ upon which the Clause tradi-
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tionally has focused is a speciªc interest in physical or intellectual 
property.”184
 The dissent noted that in one of the cases cited by the plurality, 
Connolly v. Pension Beneªt Guaranty Co.,185 the Court found that in fact 
no taking had occurred because “the Government does not physically 
invade or permanently appropriate any . . . assets for its own use.”186 
Like Justice Kennedy, the dissent believed that “there is no need to 
torture the Takings Clause to ªt this case.”187
 Justice Breyer disagreed that there was a due process violation, in 
part because he believed that a causal nexus existed between Eastern 
Enterprises and the coal miners.188 “The substantive question before 
us,” he wrote, “is whether or not it is fundamentally unfair to require 
Eastern to make future payments for health care costs of retired min-
ers and their families, on the basis of Eastern’s past association with 
these miners.”189 Justice Breyer emphasized that there was a relation-
ship between Eastern Enterprises and the miners it had employed, as 
well as a series of “promises” made by Eastern Enterprises to those 
miners.190 Clearly, the dissent focused on the nexus that existed be-
tween the miners and Eastern Enterprises, and found that under a 
due process analysis, the nexus was sufªcient to render Congress’s 
actions constitutional.191 Therefore, it appears that the dissent was 
willing to say that common law enterprise liability can create a 
sufªcient nexus to pass constitutional muster.192
 Due to the split in analyses, lower courts have not read Eastern 
Enterprises to hold any speciªc rule of law.193 The takings analysis 
adopted by the plurality, expanding the takings doctrine to include 
liabilities, was supported by a minority of Justices.194 If one counts the 
votes, however, a majority opinion—composed of Justice Breyer’s dis-
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sent and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence—held that substantive due 
process, and not takings, is the appropriate analysis for government 
actions against a private party.195
 In terms of property rights, the Court placed particular emphasis 
on “reasonably settled expectations”196 and the “reasonable certainty 
and security which are the very objects of property ownership.”197 In 
addition, due process principles require legislators to establish a ra-
tionale for why they have chosen to place burdens on private citizens, 
in order to prevent “the legislative ‘tempt[ation] to use . . . legislation 
as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.’”198 
In essence, courts must invalidate laws that deprive citizens of prop-
erty unless a rational, causal nexus exists between the party’s injury 
and the government’s action.199
 Interestingly, the Justices who chose a takings analysis rather than 
a due process analysis have tended to disfavor invalidating legislation 
based on due process challenges in the past.200 Frequently, however, 
these same Justices have been strong protectors of individual property 
rights.201 Thus, the Justices of the plurality created a paradox—one 
that could only be resolved by “tortur[ing] the takings clause” to 
achieve the desired result.202
 Eastern Enterprises does not provide an explicit test for substantive 
due process inquiries; rather, it uses the same ambiguous language 
that permeates substantive due process jurisprudence such as “arbi-
trary and irrational.”203 However, the Eastern Enterprises Court did ask 
the same questions that have been asked in prior substantive due pro-
cess cases: did the party cause the harm, and if not, did it enjoy a 
sufªciently direct beneªt from the harm? These questions appropri-
ately frame a substantive due process argument, and without afªrma-
tive answers, parties are not within a causative nexus of harm. 
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III. How Might an Eastern Enterprises Causative Nexus 
Substantive Due Process Defense Arise in the  
Toxic Cleanup Field? 
 Distilling the element of causative nexus from Eastern Enterprises’s 
substantive due process inquiry invites several interesting further in-
quiries in environmental regulatory settings. One prime area for test-
ing the proposition is the ªeld of toxic cleanup liability. 
 There are three seemingly unfair situations in which innocent 
landowners can be held liable under CERCLA and state Superfund 
laws.204 Eastern Enterprises does not answer whether these cases are 
valid under the Constitution. The value of Eastern Enterprises, however, 
lies in the way in which these cases should be analyzed. According to 
the Court’s reasoning, the appropriate inquiry is whether the party 
has caused or sufªciently beneªted from the pollution.205
 One problematic example of innocent landowner liability is 
when a landlord leases property to a tenant who “midnight dumps”206 
chemicals onto the property. Even if the landlord diligently oversees 
the property, there can be situations in which the landlord will not be 
able to prevent the tenant from polluting the land and will still be 
held liable for the cleanup costs.207 Several cases illustrate this point. 
In United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., the court found a 
landowner strictly liable for any hazardous releases by a tenant or sub-
tenant.208 The A & N Cleaners court did not allow the landlord to use 
the innocent landowner defense because there was no inquiry into 
the disposal practices of the tenant.209 Similarly, in United States v. 
Monsanto Co., the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
the innocent landowner defense is not applicable when there is “will-
ful or negligent blindness on the part of absentee owners.”210 Both 
courts were careful to note that their decisions did not require land-
                                                                                                                      
204 See Baker & Baroody, supra note 52, at 119–21. 
205 See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 531; id. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 560 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
206 Midnight dumping refers to tenants who, unbeknownst to the landlord, discharge 
pollutants in a manner that is difªcult to discover. This might include releasing barrels of 
oil late at night into efºuent streams or tampering with monitoring equipment to hide 
illegal polluting. Since a contractual relationship exists, the landlord can still be held liable 
for cleanup under CERCLA. 
207 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (2000); United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, 
Inc., 854 F. Supp. 229, 238–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
208 854 F. Supp. at 244. 
209 Id. 
210 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988). 
418 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:395 
lords to practice speciªc investigatory methods; however, neither 
court deªned what constitutes non-negligent investigation sufªcient 
to maintain an innocent landowner defense.211
 A substantive due process claim would require a different ap-
proach to determine whether or not the landlord is within the causa-
tive nexus necessary for liability.212 In the example above, a court 
would need to address whether or not the landlord caused the pollu-
tion, and if not, whether the landlord directly beneªted from the 
harm.213 It appears that in a midnight dumping case, the tenant is the 
sole polluter; thus, assessment of the landowner’s liability would re-
quire an inquiry into any possible beneªts that he or she received 
from allowing the pollution to occur.214 Certainly, the landlord 
proªted from leasing the property, but was the proªt enhanced due 
to the pollution? Was the landlord paid extra money to look the other 
way, or was there some other beneªt granted to allow for the pollu-
tion? These questions could guide a court in determining whether or 
not a sufªcient nexus exists between the landlord and the liability.215
 Another troubling scenario occurs when purchasers do not meet 
the “all appropriate inquiry” standard needed for the innocent land-
owner defense.216 Suppose, for example, that Mom and Pop Retiree 
purchase their dream home for $200,000 and begin renovations with 
what is left of their retirement savings. Prior to purchasing the home, 
the Retirees conducted a sixty-year title search and saw no indication 
of any commercial or industrial activity.217 Because there did not seem 
to be a need, they did not conduct an environmental site assessment. 
However, when they break ground to renovate the house, toxins are 
found. Mom and Pop call EPA and remediation ensues. EPA is unable 
to ªnd the responsible parties, however, and thus, it holds the Retir-
ees liable for the entire cleanup cost. While it is likely that EPA would 
enter into settlement negotiations and greatly reduce this burden, the 
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statute, as currently interpreted, would hold the Retirees responsible 
for all costs associated with remediation.218
 Since the property was already polluted when the Retirees took 
ownership, the court would need to examine whether the Retirees 
beneªted from purchasing contaminated property. Several factors 
could shape this inquiry, such as whether the Retirees paid a dis-
counted price for the property.219 If they did not, it would seem that 
the Retirees were sufªciently outside the causal nexus, and holding 
them liable for cleanup would be irrational and would shock the con-
science. 
 The third scenario occurs in states such as Massachusetts, which 
cap rather than excuse liability for innocent landowners up to the value 
of the land.220 Because the innocent landowner defense caps liability 
only at the value of the land, even when an illegal trespass and dump-
ing occurs on the property, the landowner can be held liable for the 
entire value of the property.221 For Example, John and Jane Landowner 
reside on twenty-ªve acres in Norfolk, Massachusetts.222 Midnight 
Dumper, who runs a “recycling” business next door, regularly backs his 
trailers full of ºuorescent bulbs into the pond on the Landowners’ 
property late at night.223 After several years of doing this, Dumper dis-
solves his business and disappears. When the Landowners see the bulbs 
in the pond, they call the Department of Environmental Protection, 
which informs them that, because they are innocent, they will only have 
to pay the state $650,000, the value of their land.224 Even if the De-
partment of Environmental Protection uses its discretion to demand 
only half of the cleanup costs, the Landowners will be responsible for 
paying over $300,000 to remediate property that they never polluted. 
                                                                                                                      
218 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Baker & Baroody, supra note 52, at 115–16. 
219 See AL Tech Specialty. Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int’l Credit Corp., 104 F.3d 601, 607 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a discounted price could be seen as a beneªt created by 
the pollution and should be a factor in a CERCLA analysis). 
220 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 5(d) (2002). 
221 See id. 
222 Norfolk, Massachusetts was chosen for this example because it is a community that 
has industrial and commercial properties in reasonable proximity to large agricultural 
areas. Norfolk also has many lakes and ponds. 
223 Fluorescent light bulbs contain high amounts of mercury, a toxic substance. See 
Hazardous Waste Management System; Modiªcation of the Hazardous Waste Program; 
Hazardous Waste Lamps, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,466, 36,467 ( July 6, 1999) (codiªed at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 260, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 273) (discussing ºuorescent lamps’ toxicity and adding 
them to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act list of universal wastes). 
224 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 5(d). 
420 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:395 
 Eastern Enterprises provides insight into how to address a substan-
tive due process claim in such a scenario.225 Since the Landowners did 
not pollute the land themselves, a court should inquire whether they 
beneªted from the pollution in any way.226 In this example, short of 
some sort of collusion between the neighbors, it is very difªcult to en-
vision a scenario in which the Landowners could possibly have 
beneªted from this pollution. 
Conclusion 
 To determine whether an Eastern Enterprises causative nexus exists 
between a Superfund defendant and the harm courts ªrst must de-
termine whether the defendant caused the pollution. Beyond actual 
causation, there may still be a sufªcient nexus, particularly in cases 
where the party held responsible directly beneªted from the harm. 
Each of the Eastern Enterprises opinions focused on whether the causal 
nexus—the beneªt from the harm—was strong enough so as to not 
“shock the conscience” by attaching liability. 
 Though the legal commentary has focused extensively on Eastern 
Enterprises’s importance for cases involving takings and retroactive li-
ability, the causative nexus analysis adds another dimension to its im-
portance. By analyzing the Justices’ opinions, it is clear that when the 
government assigns liability or compels a private party to act, the 
courts should undertake a substantive due process analysis. This in-
quiry would appropriately determine whether the private party is 
within a sufªciently causal nexus, and therefore can constitutionally 
be held responsible for the alleged harms. 
 This line of reasoning is important for state and federal Super-
fund actions, particularly when innocent landowners are involved. 
Courts will need to address the causative nexus issue when determin-
ing liability in order to ensure that Superfund legislation does not 
place unconstitutional burdens on private citizens. Just as the Court 
asked “why Eastern [Enterprises]?”227 when addressing the constitu-
tionality of the Coal Act, substantive due process requires courts to ask 
why a Potentially Responsible Party is the appropriate party to pay for 
a cleanup and whether such a burden is in line with this nation’s tra-
ditional notions of fairness. 
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